Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, reinforces the widely held view that non-consensual secession must be grounded in exceptional circumstances which were found to be lacking in all of these situations. It also reaffirms the principle that territorial changes brought about by external intervention will not be recognised. However, while legal assessments of these incidents may appear prima facie straightforward, they cannot be entirely divorced from the wider political phenomenon of ethnic conflict in former Soviet states and tensions existing in those states between factions seeking to further European integration and those prioritising strengthening relations with Russia. The international legal reasoning employed by the key protagonists must be understood with reference to this wider context.
Introduction
On 16 th March 2014 , following tensions culminating in Russian intervention, a referendum was held within the Ukrainian republic of Crimea in which an overwhelming majority of those taking part purportedly voted in favour of Crimea's secession from Ukraine and integration within Russia. Two days later, the Kremlin proclaimed that Crimea was now part of Russia. By this point, Ukrainian authorities had effectively ceased to exercise any control over the territory, Russian military reinforcements in Crimea following its purported incorporation within the Russian Federation having ensured the departure of the remaining Ukrainian military contingents. These developments were roundly condemned by both Ukrainian authorities and large sections of the international community who regard Crimea's purported secession as little more than a case of unlawful annexation by Russia. By contrast, Russia -and evidently a clear majority of the Crimean population -considers union with Russia a legitimate expression of the will of the inhabitants of Crimea, many of whom are ethnic Russians and enjoy a strong historic connection with Russia.
Since Crimea's incorporation within Russia, other pro-Russian separatist movements have gained strength in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, seizing control in those areas and holding so-called referenda in which those administering them claim overwhelming majorities in favour of independence from Ukraine (with some overtures towards possible ultimate union with Russia). The situations in these regions remain unresolved as they continue to be beset by conflict between Ukrainian military forces and Russian-backed separatist groups.
Russia's intervention in Crimea and its purported secession from Ukraine cannot be considered in isolation, but must rather be understood in the context of a series of secessionist pressures within former Soviet republics where Russia has also intervened. It has been noted that, "Crimea followed on from South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the third in a trio of 'similar cases'." 1 There are certainly some striking comparisons to be drawn with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 2 regions within Georgia which, supported by Russian intervention, have proclaimed their independence and currently operate as de facto states notwithstanding the almost universal refusal of the international community to recognise them. Reference to South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be relevant throughout the substantive treatment of issues concerning Crimea.
The international legal issues raised by events in Crimea, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are far from insignificant. This paper seeks to explore the issue of Crimea's purported secession from Ukraine during 2014 against a backdrop of external intervention by Russia. We consider this event primarily with reference to the relevant international legal norms, but also within its geopolitical context. We begin by providing some historical context to events in Crimea; in light of the similarities between the cases, by way of background to understanding Russian claims made in respect of Crimea, we briefly outline the course of events in South Ossetia and Abkhazia leading to their de facto independence from Georgia.
The development of Crimea's status through the Soviet era to the present day is then detailed.
Attention is then given to the concept of secession in international law and the relevant framework applicable to its exercise, before more specifically to the question of whether 1 Navari (2014 Navari ( : 1313 . 2 Na a i : otes that all th ee se essio ist e tities lai ed a i g deg ees of politi al supp essio a d su je tio to the th eat a d use of iole e .
Historical Background

A note on South Ossetia and Abkhazia
As has already been noted, the Crimean episode bears some resemblance to earlier developments within the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and reference to those developments will be helpful in providing some context to the more recent events in Crimea. South Ossetia is a semi-autonomous region within Georgia, the population of which is predominantly ethnically Ossetian, a group divided between South Ossetia in Georgia and North Ossetia in Russia. Ethnic Georgians comprise only a minority group within South Ossetia, albeit a sizeable one. 3 The Ossetian people are of Iranian origin and enjoy a distinctive culture, language, and history of self-rule. 4 South Ossetia had been under Russian rule during the nineteenth century, 5 and although always part of Georgia during the Soviet era, the population of South Ossetia have a long history of good relations with Russia, 6 it being home to the larger share of the ethnic Ossetian population within the region. In the post-Cold Chatham (2011: 77-78) . 11 For brief details, see Toomey (2009: 450-452) . 12 See Musselman (2010: 322-324); NuBberger (2009: 345-346 See Musselman (2010: 325-329 22 Crimea was nonetheless identified as one potential source of tension at that time, one observer noting that, "The Crimea has been specifically referred to as, 'one of the most sensitive regions in South-Eastern Europe'", adding that "there is fear that it will turn into yet 16 See Davies (1997: 816) . 17 See NuBberger (2009: 361-2) .
18 Wydra (2004: 112) . 19 See Magosi (1996: 172-178) . 20 See Wydra (2004: 112) . 21 See Magosi (1996: 653) . 22 On some of these post-Soviet secessionist conflicts, see, eg., Gaweda & Siddi (2012) ; Sterio (2013: 130-160 Bugajski (2000: 173-175) . 25 See Chase (1996: 223); Wydra (2004: 121-129) . See also Sasse (2002) . 26 See, eg., White, McAlister & Feklyunina (2010) . On ethnic and national identity more generally within postSoviet Ukraine, see Liber (1998); Nemyria (1999) .
27
Uk ai e all o e EU ag ee e t dela , BBC Ne s O li e, No e e <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25083801 >.
28
"ee Uk ai ia MPs ote to oust P eside t Ya uko h , BBC Ne s O li e, Fe ua <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26304842 >. O the se ue e of e e ts leadi g up to C i ea s incorporation within Russia, see Smith & Harari (2014: 1 29 See Shuster (2014: 20-25) .
30
C i ea efe e du : Vote s a k 'ussia u io , BBC Ne s O li e, Ma h <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26606097 >.
31
Puti stated that, E e thi g i C i ea speaks of ou sha ed histo a d p ide…I people s hea ts a d i ds, C i ea has al a s ee a i sepa a le pa t of 'ussia. "ee P eside t Puti s "pee h of Ma h , available at the Kremlin website, <eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889 >. 32 See, eg., Uk ai e C isis: 'ussia isolated i UN C i ea ote , BBC Ne s O li e, Ma h <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26595776>. 33 See G suspe ds 'ussia fo a e atio of C i ea , The Teleg aph, Ma h <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8-suspends-Russia-for-annexation-ofCrimea.html >. 34 36 See, eg., P o-'ussia e els o to take o t ol of i f ast u tu e a oss Do etsk egio , The Gua dia , April 2014 <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/14/ukraine-deadline-pro-russian-rebels-passes >.
37
Uk ai e e els hold efe e du s i Do etsk a d Luha sk , BBC Ne s Online, 11 May 2014 <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27360146 >.
The Case for Secession or Irredentism
Secession has been defined as "the effort of a group or section of a state to withdraw itself from the political or constitutional authority of that state."
38 There has been a tendency to apply the term "secession" to those instances in which territorial entities break away from their parent state and assert their independent statehood. 39 Where a territorial entity breaks away from its parent state in order to join another state -usually with which it shares ethnic, national, religious or linguistic characteristics and/or a strong historical connection -that process is generally considered an instance of irredentism. That Crimea has purported to form a union with Russia -unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have declared their own independent statehood -might suggest that the latter term is more suited to its treatment within the present discussion. However, it is contended that framing consideration of the Crimean episode within the parameters of discourse on secession is appropriate for two principal reasons. First, "secession" implies a breaking off from an existing territorial relationship. While it may result in independence, it can also serve as a precursor to union with another state. Indeed, some international lawyers have defined secession to encompass such an outcome. 40 The legal principles which govern secession are therefore equally applicable to processes resulting in entities breaking away from one state and joining another.
Second, there has been very little treatment of irredentism as a separate legal concept, 41 probably owing largely to the fact that there have been so few situations in which a territorial unit seeks union with another state as opposed to outright independence.
There is a considerable degree of consensus that while international law does not explicitly prohibit secession by entities within existing states, nor does it provide any general 38 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 2 SCR [1998] 217, at para.83. 39 See, eg., above, where the decision goes on to define secession as a process directed towards the achievement of independent statehood on the part of the seceding entity. 40 See, eg., Dugard & Raic (2006: 101-102) . 41 For discussion, however, in the context of Somalia, Germany and Cyprus, see Musgrave (1997: 211-229 States have approached non-consensual secession cautiously. 46 As Jaber has noted, "although states have consistently upheld the right to secession where it is the product of a consensual arrangement with the state, they have generally not accepted unilateral secessions that violate the territorial integrity of independent states." 47 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the "historical criteria for international recognition of claims of secession include the approval of the state from which the entity in question is seceding, the degree of repression within the larger state, historical claims of independence, the extent to which the seceding region has exhausted possibilities of a negotiated settlement of its disputes, the ability of the new state to maintain internal order and defend its borders, and the extent to which secession would be destabilizing." 48 The case of Bangladesh appears to have been the only instance in which a seceding entity has been given the legitimation of international 42 See, eg., Quebec decision, paras.111-112. 43 For discussion, see Sheeran (2011); Vidmar (2011-12) . 44 As of April 2014, Crimea had only been recognised as part of Russia by Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela. 45 Abkhazia and South Ossetia are only recognised as independent states by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. 46 See Halperin & Scheffer (1992: 13-16 ); Crawford (2006: 388-391) . 47 Jaber (2011: 934) . See also Crawford (1998) . Orakhelashvili (2008: 1) notes that even in the early post-Cold War era, where 21 new states rapidly came into existence, the principle that no entity may secede without the consent of its parent state retained validity. 48 Chase (1996: 232) .
recognition against the will of the parent state, 49 although a more recent precedent might be found in respect of the large number of states to have recognized Kosovo.
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From the standpoint of international law, the starting point from which attempts to identify norms which might legitimate acts of secession might be made has usually been the principle of self-determination.
51
Indeed, Russia sought to legitimise Crimea's secession from
Ukraine by reference to the principle of external self-determination.
52
Whereas the principle's 'internal' dimension effectively refers to the right of a state's population to determine their own political system and form of government,
53
'external' self-determination concerns the process by which a territorial unit removes itself from the sovereign authority of its parent state, whether by seceding to form a newly independent state or through union with another state. Although its philosophical and political origins can be traced much earlier, 54 selfdetermination as a legal principle was developed through a series of UN General Assembly resolutions. 55 It was at least initially conceived as a principle applicable to the decolonisation process in the post-World War Two period, 56 and has been recognised by the ICJ as "one of the essential principles of contemporary international law." 57 The initial focus on decolonisation was evident in the language of General Assembly resolutions 1514 and 1541, the former being proclaimed a "declaration on the granting of independence to colonial 49 For discussion, see Buchheit (1978: 198-214 Summers (2011) . 51 The long history of the idea of self-determination is beyond our present scope. For an overview, see Summers (2007: 83) . 52 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV.7144, at 8; UN Doc. A/68/PV.80, at 3, for Russian statements to this effect. These are detailed in Christakis (2015) . 53 On the nature of internal self-determination, see Halperin & Scheffer (1992: 16-20) ; Summers (2013) ; Quebec decision, paras.17, 33-39. 54 See Musgrave (1997: 15-31) ; Summers (2007) . 55 See GA Res. 1514 (1960 ; GA Res 1541 (1960 ; GA Res 2625 (1970 . 56 See, eg., Halperin & Scheffer (1992: 20-25) ; Cassese (1995: ch3) ; Crawford (2006: 107-131) . 57 East Timor (Portugal v Australia), ICJ Rep, 1995, 91 , at para.29. For further discussion of self-dete i atio s consideration by the ICJ, see Musgrave (1997: 77-90 Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.'
60
While beginning with a presumption against the dismemberment or impairment of the territory of an existing state, the latter part of the provision has been taken to suggest that where a state in a non-colonial setting does not afford equal protection or representation to all of its citizens, then in certain defined circumstances a sufficiently disadvantaged group within that state may have a right of 'remedial' secession. Effectively, because it has been unable to exercise a right of internal self-determination through adequate participation and representation within the state's political structures, the right to self-determination can only be exercised externally through an act of "divorce" from the state; secession. While there is 58 Para.5. Resolution1541 defined with greater clarity the obligations imposed by resolution 1514. 59 See, eg., Buchheit (197 : , ho a gues that The histo of U ited Natio s p a ti e le ds su sta tial support to the thesis that the principle of self-dete i atio …is p i a il a ehi le fo de olo izatio , ot a autho izatio of se essio . 60 GA Res. 2625 Res. (1970 .
some support for such a view, 61 there is no clear consensus upon this matter, 62 although it is suggested that support for 'remedial secession' has grown in recent times. 63 Without clearly defined criteria, there is obviously a danger that acknowledging a right to secede opens the door to a broad range of claims from various dissatisfied minority groupings. The main areas of debate concern the form of action on the part of the parent state which will give rise to a right of secession for an oppressed group, and who constitutes a 'people' capable of exercising such a right.
While self-determination is stated within the various instruments to be a right of "peoples", there is no universal definition as to who constitutes a "people" for such purposes.
Resolution 2625 itself makes reference to "race, creed, or colour" as characteristics of a people, and those attempts that have been made to define the term "peoples" for selfdetermination purposes have tended to make reference to a group's shared ethnicity, language, The issue of dete i i g the e iste e of a people fo self-determination purposes is even more problematic in the cases of Donetsk and Luhansk, where ethnic Russians account for a minority of the population as a whole, and the ethnic Ukrainian share of the population is considerably larger than in Crimea. 70 See, eg., C i ea s efe e du as a sha displa of de o a , The Gua dia , Ma h <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/17/crimea-referendum-sham-display-democracy-ukraine>. 71 Cassese (1995: 119-120) . See also Knop (2002: 74) . 76 Weller (2008: 59 Chesterman (2014: 2) . See also Smith & Harari (2014: 26) ; Malyarenko & Galbraith (2013: 918) . 83 Although, for speculation as to ulterior motives on the part of intervening states, see Pinter (2000) ; Ali (2000) . Sig ifi a tl , Koso o s pu po ted se essio f o "e ia a e se e al ea s late a d took the fo of a proclamation of independent statehood. 84 See Human Rights Watch (2014).
Although any right of secession in international law arises only in narrowly circumscribed circumstances, at the same time there is no prohibition upon acts of secession as such. This much was confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion upon the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence. 85 Where secession arises in opposition to the will of the parent While the result of the Crimean referendum on the option of union with Russia may well represent a reliable and authoritative expression of the wishes of a majority of that territory's population, especially given that a majority of the population were ethnic Russians, it took place against the will of the parent state, Ukraine. What is more, it was arguably only possible as a result of the role played by Russia, an external actor. As Ukraine itself noted, "The declaration of independence by the Crimean Republic is a direct consequence of the application of the use of force and threats against Ukraine by the Russian Federation."
95
Without this it is inconceivable that any referendum or resulting territorial realignment of the territory would have been possible. As Allison notes, "The core issue is that Russia created an illegal territorial situation by using the threat of force," the referendum having taken place 89 See Ronen (1979: 61-70 Fo e a ple, I a s a e atio of Ku ait as o de ed the "e u it Cou il "C 'es , as as Is ael s a e atio of East Je usale "C 'es . 93 See Buchheit (1978: 198-214) ; Castellino (2000: 147-172 Marxsen (2014) . 102 See Puti s e a ks aise fea s of futu e o es agai st Uk ai e , The Washi gto Post, April 2014 <www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-beforevote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html >.
Although the extent to which Russia used force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the Ukraine may be debated, that it intervened in Crimea and was responsible for the application of coercive measures is largely undisputed. 103 In any event it might also be noted that violations of Article 2 (4) can take more subtle forms. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice noted that a state could be held responsible for the armed activities of third party actors where these perform acts under its "effective control". Wilson (2012: 183) . See also Gray (2004: 108-120) .
107
'ussia s justifications for action taken in respect of South Ossetia and Abkhazia broadly revolved around self-defence, fulfilment of peacekeeping functions, and the protection of civilians. See NuBberger (2013: para.29); Petro (2008 Petro ( : 1528 Petro ( -1537 ; Toomey (2009: 464-5) . A o t o e sial aspe t of 'ussia s pu po ted justifications was to claim protection of Russian nationals in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, these being essentially Georgian nationals it had dubiously conferred Russian citizenship upon in order to be able to claim an interest in their treatment. See further Pet o : ; Higgi s & O 'eill : ; Too e : 475-6); Chatham (2011: 93-95) . 108 Allison ( : 1260 democratic legitimacy for the change of government in Kiev, strictly speaking the terms of the Ukrainian constitution set a higher standard which must be satisfied for impeachment to proceed.
110 However, this is internationally irrelevant. Irrespective of the merits of this course of action, this is a domestic and not an international matter. It does not provide any legal authority for external intervention. However, its relevance must be seen in the context of the two principal justifications alluded to by Russia.
Russia claimed to have received an invitation from the ousted President Yanyukovch to intervene. 111 State authorities may invite foreign forces onto their territories to assist in responding to crisis or conflict situations, 112 but who exactly is entitled to issue this invitation depends upon which of two approaches are adopted in respect of the identification of the state's government: the 'effective control' and 'popular sovereignty' models. The former attaches significance to a government's exercise of effective control within the state, whereas the latter looks to its democratic legitimacy. 113 International law appears to have provided no consistent practice upon the approach to be taken, 114 although there is some evidence that the latter has gained in support in recent years. 115 Nonetheless, neither is particularly helpful to Russia's argument. Yanyukovych had lost effective control within the Ukraine. Applying the 'effective control' theory of authority, this meant he had no power to issue such an invitation.
While the alternative 'popular sovereignty' theory holds that a deposed leader or regime endowed with democratic legitimacy may still be treated as the legitimate authority within 110 Article 111 sets out a series of procedures to be followed for a president to be removed following impeachment, which do not appear to have been followed. Furthermore, the decision to remove Yanyukovych did not quite receive the three quarters majority specified by Article 111. 111 See, eg., UN Doc. S/PV. 7124, above n91, 5. See further Allison ( : 1264 .
112
Note, fo e a ple, the UN "e u it Cou il s el o i g of the F e h i te e tio i Mali at the e uest of its government: SC Res. 2100 (2013) . See also the judgment of the ICJ in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), ICJ Rep, 2005, 168. 113 See Roth (1999: 136-149) . 114 See Gray (2004: 83-87) . 115 See, eg., Marxsen (2014: 374-380) , for consideration of possible cases in which invitations emanating from democratically elected governments lacking effective control have resulted in intervention.
the state, the scale of support for Yanyukovych's impeachment would suggest that the legitimacy conferred by popular sovereignty now resided with the new regime in Kiev.
Although not explicitly invoking the controversial doctrine of humanitarian intervention, Russia nonetheless referred to the need to protect Russian citizens within the Ukraine, 116 an argument advanced at the time of its equally controversial incursion into the Petro (2008 Petro ( : 1525 Petro ( -1533 Musselman (2010: 329-336) . 118 The literature which the topic has generated is voluminous. See, eg., Chesterman (2001); Wheeler (2002); Teson (2005) . 119 See, eg., Cassese (1999: 27) who advocates that the requirements for humanitarian intervention should i lude i lude g oss a d eg egious ea hes of hu a ights i ol i g loss of life of hu d eds o thousa ds of i o e t people, a d a ou ti g to i es agai st hu a it … , a tio to halt su h at o ities ei g take a group of states, with support or non-opposition of a majority of UN member states, and the use of armed force being limited to halting the atrocities. None of these criteria were present in respect of any Russian intervention in Crimea. 120 See, eg., Franck (2002: 76-96) ; Gray (2004: 126-129) . 121 Green (2014: 3) . 122 Green (2014: 3) . See Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), ICJ Rep 1955, 4. In any event, there was little evidence to suggest that this group faced any serious level of suffering at the hands of the Ukrainian authorities.
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The Broader Legal and Political Context of Crimea
In legal terms, any assessment of events in Crimea -and indeed earlier episodes involving secessionist pressures within the former Soviet space -is relatively straightforward. There is no general right to secede within international law and although secession is not prohibited either, the prevailing weight of international legal opinion holds it to be invalid when (i) it occurs in the face of the opposition of the parent state in the absence of exceptional circumstances which might warrant a right of 'remedial' secession in accordance with the principles contained within the 'saving clause' of the Friendly Relations declaration; and (ii) it is effected by external intervention. The Crimean episode exhibits both characteristics and the international community has overwhelmingly declined to extend recognition to Crimea's purported union with Russia.
International law does not, however, operate in a vacuum. Its development is informed by the actions of states, which in turn are driven by political agendas that do not always conform with the dominant body of thought upon the correct application of the core principles of international law. Regardless of the legal relationship between statehood and recognition, 124 on a practical level issues pertaining to legal sovereignty over territory cannot be divorced from the political effects of recognition. Russia's intervention within Crimea may have produced a de facto situation that is irreversible, but as with other recent assertions 123 See Allison ( : 1262 ; Marxsen (2014: 373-4) . 124 The more popular declaratory theory of recognition considers the effects of recognition to be merely declaratory: they evidence a pre-existing fact, namely that X satisfies the criteria of statehood, or is part of state Y. The constitutive theory deems a te ito s i te atio al status to e depe de t upo the e og itio of others. For discussion of both theories, see, eg., Shaw (2008: 445-454 Crimea does not purport to exist as an independent state -in contrast to, for example, Northern Cyprus -but rather as part of another state, Russia, which must become the target of efforts designed to cause international isolation. Sanctions have been imposed upon Russia in consequence of its intervention in Ukraine, 129 but the longer term effects of these remain to be seen and it must be borne in mind that Russia is a major international power.
An important point which has been highlighted well by the Crimean episode is the inconsistency with which some states will seek to invoke norms of international law in support of their causes or to oppose the causes of others. It is a plausible claim that every instance of attempted secession comes with its own unique characteristics. Crimea is only the latest in a line of secessionist pressures which continue to challenge fundamental 125 See, eg., Ronen (1979: 54-61) ; Sterio (2013: 103-113) . 126 See Castellino (2000: 173-258) . See, also, Cassese(1995: 214-218) ; Knop (2002: 110-167) . 127 See Tocci (2003) . 128 Almqvist (2013: 165, 170 Although detailed assessments of the geopolitical dimensions to the Crimean episode are probably better left to scholars of international relations, an understanding of these is helpful in order to appreciate the factors which have driven the shift in legal rhetoric employed by Russia in attempts to legitimise its role in developments within Crimea.
Politically, the Crimean issue forms merely part of a much larger regional power struggle.
There is certainly a wider issue concerning relations between Russia and Ukraine more generally, conflict between Ukrainian authorities and Russian backed separatist groups having spread to other areas in the south-east of Ukraine, principally Donetsk and Luhansk, which have proclaimed their secession from the Ukraine and within which conflict continues to rage. However, Russia's interest in developments within Ukraine represents just one aspect of its more general concern for the future development of its relations with its neighbours within the former Soviet space. As noted by Allison, "Russian intervention in Allison ( : 1269 . 138 Allison ( : 1256 . 139 See, eg., Malyarenko & Galbraith (2013: 920-926 See Smith & Hariri (2014: 37-38 ).
Ukraine's apparent movement towards possible absorption within EU and NATO structures was clearly a source of concern for Russia. 143 However, Ukraine is just one example within recent years of the playing out of tensions between Russia and the West, and developments in Georgia and Moldova in particular have also received Russia's attention.
144
In breakaway regions within these states, "the Russian government has supported separatism…the key element of Putin's strategy is to use these breakaway regions as perches from which to threaten the larger states that once governed them..Russian military forces operate in these regions and guarantee their security." 145 A deterioration in relations between
Russia and pro-Russian regimes and western powers has already taken place and this latest episode threatens to harden these fault lines and potentially return the state of geopolitical affairs to one dominated by a new Cold War.
Conclusions
Prima facie, it is possible to draw some relatively simple conclusions from the Crimean episode. The prevailing weight of international legal opinion holds that Crimea's incorporation within Russia is unlawful. Although secession is not expressly prohibited under international law, nor is there a general right of secession and each instance must be judged with reference to its particular circumstances. It is certainly a tall claim to suggest that the Crimean population has suffered some sufficiently severe oppressive treatment of the kind which would justify the exercise of a right of 'remedial secession'. More important, however, is the widespread acceptance of the rule against recognition of territorial changes brought about by an unlawful act such as the use of force, as Russia's intervention within the territory of the Ukraine was clearly understood to be. The clear international consensus upon the Crimean episode should be apparent from the widespread condemnation of Crimea's incorporation within Russia, evidenced by resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly.
Beyond legal pronouncements upon its validity, the process through which sovereignty over Crimea has effectively been removed from one state and handed to another highlight two fundamental difficulties inherent in the operation of international law within a world beset by geopolitical forces. Firstly, states are driven to act out of political or strategic objectives which are not always compatible with relevant norms of international law.
Secondly, as a consequence, international legal norms find themselves stretched, reinterpreted, and inconsistently applied as best suits a given state's objectives in the circumstances. This does not mean those norms lose their force, but it does become crucial that the international community unites in opposing dubious legal claims. On this occasion it would appear that it has done so.
